Notes to Chapter 11: Socrates in the Euthyphro and the Apology
1. Schleiermacher was the first scholar to date the Euthyphro prior to the trial of Socrates, but he gives no reasons for his doing so. He simply states it as an indubitable fact: ‘dieses Gespraech unstreitig zwischen der Anklage und der Verurtheilung des Sokrates geschrieben ist’. [‘this dialogue was undoubtedly written in between the formal accusation and the judicial condemnation of Socrates’] (F. Schleiermacher, Platons Werke, vol. I. 2, 2nd edition, Berlin (1818), Realschulbuchhandlung, p. 53.) Stallbaum in his edition of the Euthyphro found it as indubitable as Schleiermacher that the dialogue was written prior to the trial, and he gave compelling reasons for his doing so. He says that ‘almost the whole dialogue is pervaded by a bold and untroubled hilarity and charm that is free from any foreboding and suspicion that a catastrophe was forthcoming’ (per totum fere sermonum regnet proterva quaedam aut certe secura hilaritas multusque lepos ab omni tristis alicuius casus praesagitatione vel suspicione alienus). Stallbaum goes on to say that ‘for this reason we believe that when Plato wrote the dialogue, he firmly hoped that Socrates would win the case’ (Quocirca etiam Platonum putamus certissime speravisse futurum esse, ut Socratis causa triumpharet). In his view ‘this hope on Plato’s part must have been the more strong the more he trusted in Socrates’ learning and excellence’ (eaque spes ipsius tanto firmior esse debuit, quo plus ipse disciplinae viri ac virtuti tribueret). (Platonis Meno et Euthyphro, recensuit et Prolegomenis atque Commentariis illustravit Godofredus Stallbaum, Gothae 1836, Guil Hennings, p. 145.)
2. G. Grote, Plato, John Murray, London 1867, 2nd edition, vol. i, p. 204.
3. Concerning the twentieth century, a prominent exponent of the modern dating is Wilamowitz, who found it ‘inconceivable’ that the Euthyphro could have been written prior to Socrates’ trial, as Burnet notes in his ‘Introductory Note’ to the dialogue. Burnet does not say why Wilamowitz found it ‘inconceivable’, he simply wholeheartedly agrees with him on this point. (J. Burnet, Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology and Crito, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924, p. 4.) I find this strange, for if you read Wilamowitz you find that his reason for dating the composition of the Euthyphro after the death of Socrates lies in his contention that the story of Euthyphro’s case against his father, which is central to the dialogue, could not have been brought to the King Archon at the time when Socrates was summoned to the King to face Meletus’ accusation, and Burnet in one of his notes demolishes Wilamowitz’ argument without any mention of Wilamowitz.
Wilamowitz argues that according to Euthyphro’s narrative the alleged murder of his servant by Euthyphro’s father took place in Naxos at the time when he and his father were farmers in Naxos, which therefore must have happened prior to 404, yet Euthyphro in the dialogue is portrayed as pursuing the case four years later, that is in the winter of 400/399, and this he views as totally impossible. (Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Platon, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin1920, 2nd edition, vol. ii, p. 76: ‘Dann ist die Klage, vier Jahre und mehr nach der Tat, undenkbar.’ [‘Four years and more after the deed the law-suit is unthinkable.’])
Burnet in his note on hôs egeôrgoumen en têi Naxôi at 4c4 writes: ‘It is generally assumed that they were klêrouchoi [men in possession of farming land allotted to them by the Athenian government], and it is pointed out that the Athenians had to give up their klêrouchiai [allotments] in 404 B.C. Surprise is expressed that Euthyphro should have waited five years before trying to get rid of the pollution, and Schanz (Introd. p. 11) infers that Plato has committed a deliberate anachronism in order to bring Euthyphro’s case into connexion with that of Socrates. This argument, however, ignores the particular situation existing at the time. After the restoration of the democracy in 403 B.C., the laws of Solon and Draco were provisionally adopted, but there was great uncertainty about their application, and a commission was appointed to revise and codify the laws of Athens, which did not complete its work till the archonship of Xenaenetus, i.e. 401/0 B.C. (Ar. Ath. Pol. 40, 4), and it seems that the courts were practically inactive till that date.’
4. Cf. John Burnet, Plato’s Phaedo, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1911, ‘Introduction’ n.1.
5. Some might see Euthyphro’s action against his father as fully justified and Socrates’ intervention as meddling. It is on this basis that K. R. Popper views the dialogue as ‘the earliest example’ of Plato’s struggle against Socrates, that is of Plato with ‘his own oligarchic inclinations’ against ‘Socrates’ humanitarianism’. If I understand Popper correctly, he views Euthyphro as a representative of the Socratic respect for law and humanitarian morality, Socrates’ attempts to dissuade him from his intended course of action as Plato’s misappropriation of Socrates for his own ends. With the self-assurance of a modern interpreter, Popper enters the head of Plato and tells us what thought motivated him in writing his dialogue: ‘I am not going to be like Euthyphro, Plato assures himself; I shall never take it upon myself to accuse my own father, my own venerated ancestors, of having sinned against a law and a humanitarian morality which is on the level of vulgar piety. Even if they took human life, it was, after all, only the lives of their own serfs, who are no better than criminals; and it is not my task to judge them ...’ (K.R. Popper, op. cit. p.197. ) P.T. Geach also takes the side of Euthyphro against Socrates, as he perceives their contrasting roles. He writes: ‘what upset Euthyphro was the way his father “was heedless and made little of the man, even if he should die”. How far Euthyphro was from making a fuss about nothing comes out in the fact that in quite a number of civilized jurisdictions a man who acted like Euthyphro’s father would be held guilty of a serious crime.’ (P.T. Geach, ‘Plato’s Euthyphro; an Analysis and Commentary’, Monist 50 (1966), p. 370.) I do not dispute the fact that modern readers of the dialogue may have very different sensibilities from Euthyphro’s contemporaries, although it must be said that there are some modern interpreters who unreservedly condemn Euthyphro, that is Euthyphro as they perceive him. Thus R.F. Holland writes: ‘Euthyphro comes out in the colours of a sanctimonious modernist. A traditional believer would have wanted the house to be cleansed and his father ritualistically purified, and would have sought advice from a religious authority (in the manner of Euthyphro’s father). Euthyphro goes to court with an indictment. In a different age he would have done well in the Nazi Youth Movement but for his tendency to go against the swim.’ (R.F. Holland, ‘Euthyphro’, Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, vol. 82 (1982), p. 5.).
6. Translation B. Jowett, with the exception of line 15 d5-6. Jowett translates : ‘you would never ... have charged your aged father with murder’, which suggests that Euthyphro did charge his father with murder. But Socrates’ words ouk estin hopôs an pote epecheirêsas ... andra presbuteron patera diôkathein phonou have no such implications. The word epicheireô, as Liddell & Scott amply testify, means ‘put one’s hand to’, ‘set to work at’, ‘endeavour’, ‘attempt to do’. I therefore translate ‘you would never ... have attempted (epecheirêsas) to prosecute (diôkathein) your aged father for murder’
7. P.T. Geach, op.cit. p. 382.
8. A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1978), p. 178. For my criticism of Kenny’s interpretation of the Euthyphro and of his interpretation of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, which depends on it, see my ‘Pursuit of Philosophy’, History of Political Thought, vol. v. (Winter 1984), pp. 527-242.
9. Well aware that Euthyphro’s final words preclude his going to the King Archon after his discussion with Socrates, yet unwilling to see that Socrates successfully deterred Euthyphro from his intended action, Burnet writes in his ‘Introductory note’ on the dialogue: ‘Socrates ... is waiting outside till his turn comes, when he is accosted by Euthyphro. As Euthyphro too had a case before the “King”, and as, at the end of the dialogue, he suddenly remembers another engagement (15e3), we must suppose that his business here is over for the present, and that he is coming out of the basileos stoa [the Porch of the King] when he sees Socrates.’ (Plato, Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito, edited with notes by John Burnet, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1924, repr. 2002, p. 82.
10. In the Protagoras Plato sheds light on Euthyphro’s being suddenly ‘in a hurry to go somewhere’ (nun gar speudô poi). Deeply dissatisfied with the way his discussion with Protagoras develops, Socrates says that unless Protagoras does not stop making long speeches instead of giving short answers to his questions, he will not be able to stay, for he has some engagement and ‘has to go somewhere’ (elthein gar poi me dei, 335c). The ‘need to go somewhere’ was just a polite and quite transparent excuse; it prompted Alcibiades and other members of audience to intervene. When the audience compelled Protagoras to engage with Socrates in proper discussion, he happily stayed for a very long time, until Protagoras finally gives up.
11. Tr. R.D. Hicks. Jacques A. Bailly in the ‘Introduction to the Euthyphro’ rejects Diogenes’ testimony on the grounds that it would require a different end to the dialogue. He writes: ‘An interesting claim having to do with the authenticity of the Euthyphro is found in Diogenes Laertius 2.29. There Euthyphro has a different ending: Euthuphrona de tôi patri grapsamenon xenoktonias dikên peri hosiou tina dialechtheis apêgage. “He (Socrates) dissuaded Euthyphro from prosecuting his father on a charge of murder by discussing certain things about piety with him.” There is no particular reason to take Diogenes Laertius seriously and think that the dialogue had a different ending.’ Jacques A. Bailly, Plato’s Euthyphro & Clitophon, Focus Publishing/ R. Pullins Company, Newburyport (2003), p. 15. But Diogenes’ information does not require a different ending to the dialogue; it is in tune with the ending of the dialogue as it stands.
12. Cf. D.A.Russell, ‘Introduction to Euthyphro’, The Dialogues of Plato, Sphere Books, London (1970), vol. i., p. 35: ‘The main content of the dialogue is the destruction of this certainty – though Euthyphro does not admit it, and simply excuses himself at the end (15d) from further discussion.’
13. Cf. Plato, Seventh Letter 325b-326b.
14. Cf. Stallbaum, op. cit. p. 145-6: ‘Reticetur Anyti et Lyconis nomen; unus Meletus memoratur atque ut imberbis ac procax adulescentulus notatur, quo scilicet etiam reliquorum accusatorum auctoritas atque dignitas deprimatur.’ [The names of Anytus and Lycus are left out, only Meletus is mentioned, described as a beardless and insolent young man, by which means the authority and dignity of the other prosecutors is diminished as well.’]
15. Stallbaum, op.cit. p. 143: ‘At vero, dixerit quispiam, fieri tamen illud potest, ut Plato multo tempore post Socratis obitum talem librum conscripserit. Quod ego fieri potuisse duplicem ob causam nego. Nam primum quidem ita crimen inhumanitatis nomini Platonis item adhaerebit neque ab animo eius penitus abstergeretur. Deinde universa disserendi ratio, quae in Euthyphrone dominatur, ipsumque libri argumentum eiusmodi est, ut Platoni Socratico conveniat, eidem ut philosopho sui iuris quasi facto tribui nullo modo possit.’ [‘And yet, someone might say that it is possible that Plato wrote such a book long after the death of Socrates. I reject such a possibility for two reasons. For, firstly, the judgement of inhumanity would still be attached to Plato’s name and could not be wiped off his soul. Secondly, the whole method of discussion, which is dominant in the Euthyphro, and the very argument is such, that they suit a Socratic Plato, not Plato after he became a philosopher in his own right.’]
16. See Andocides, De Mysteriis 27, 36.
17. The Theaetetus ends with Socrates’ announcement that he has to go to the Porch of the King Archon to meet the indictment which Meletus has brought against him (210b4-d4). In the Euthyphro Socrates meets Euthyphro at the Porch of the King Archon.
18. The Theaetetus is prefaced by an introduction from which we learn that Theaetetus was gravely wounded in a battle near Corinth that took place in 369 B.C. (142a-b).
19. Socrates does not name the god to which he refers, yet the definite article indicates that he refers to Apollo, the brother of Artemis, whose servant he declares himself to be on his last day, in the Phaedo (85b). Cf. L. Campbell, The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, Oxford 1867, note ad. loc. The very fact that Socrates uses the definite article without pronouncing the name points to Apollo, for when he refers to Apollo in the opening paragraphs of the Phaedo, he simply refers to him as ‘ho theos’ (hê tou theou heortê, 61a5, eis ton theon epoiêsa, 61b2).
20. In translating this passage I follow Jowett’s translation, wherever I can. I part company with him when, against the reading of the text, he derives the name of Cronus from choreô, ‘to sweep’.
21. I say temporarily, for Plato revived the notion of the soul as the self-moving principle of motion, radically revised, in his late Timaeus and the Laws. Radically revised, for in the Phaedrus the soul is the uncreated (agenêton, Phdr. 245d1, 246a1) self-moving principle of motion, whereas in the Timaeus (genomenê, 37a2) and the Laws (genomenên, 895b4) it is a created self-moving principle of motion.
22. Cf. Plato, Seventh Letter 324a5-6 together with 325c-326b.
Chapter 11: Socrates in the Euthyphro and the Apology