Julius Tomin

What is of paramount importance for the correct understanding of Aristotle’s testimony is a close examination of the Greek text and with its interplay of the present participles and of the aorists in his description of the impact of Socrates’ philosophic activities on Plato. Socrates’ continuous philosophic activity, that is his preoccupation with ethics and his search for the universal in ethical matters, is described by present participles (Sôkratous ... pragmateuomenou ... zêtountos, 987b1-3) which stand in genitive absolute and as such describe the time framework during which and the conditions under which Plato accepted Socrates as his teacher and conceived of the Forms (‘When Socrates ... was busying himself with ... was seeking’). In contrast, Plato’s acceptance of Socrates as his teacher (ekeinon apodexamenos, 987b4) is expressed by the participle of aorist, for it was an instantaneous action, as was his conception of Forms (hupelaben, 987b5). It was Socrates’ arresting his mind on definitions and keeping it thus at a standstill (peri horismôn epistêsantos prôtou tên dianoian, 987b3-4, the aorist participle expresses the entrance into the state of being at a standstill in which Socrates' mind was fixed on definitions) when he contemplated ethical concepts (peri men ta êthika pragmateuomenou, b1-2; this was an ongoing process expressed by the present participle) that made Plato conceive of the Forms in an instant (hupelaben,  the aorist), for such standing still was inexplicable in terms of the Heraclitean doctrine.

Having thus described how Plato’s encounter with Socrates resulted in his conception of the Forms Aristotle once again refers to Socrates’ philosophic activities by taking recourse to the present participle, and emphasizing that in Plato’s eyes these activities were directed at other objects than sensible things (hôs peri heterôn touto gignomenon kai ou tôn aisthêtôn, 987b5-6). It is noteworthy that there is a perfect accord between Aristotle’s account of Plato’s encounter with Socrates and Diogenes’ account in his ‘Life of Plato’: ‘At first Plato studied philosophy as a follower of Heraclitus, but afterwards, when he was about to compete for the prize with a tragedy, having listened (akousas, the participle of aorist, which closely corresponds to Aristotle's apodexamenos) to Socrates in front of the theatre of Dionysus he burnt (katephlexe, aorist, which closely corresponds to Aristotle's hupelaben) his poems’ (iii. 5). It was the impact of this first philosophic encounter with Socrates that compelled Plato to conceive of entities exempt from the Heraclitean flux, that is of Forms. In the light of these testimonies, Socrates in his attempt to prove the immortality of soul in his last philosophic discourse took recourse to Plato’s theory of Forms; which means that on his final sojourn ‘in philosophy’ (en philosophiai, Phd. 59a3) he adopted the theory of his disciple in order to overcome the state of philosophic ignorance within which his thought was as if imprisoned until his final days.

If we view the Phaedo in the light of Aristotle's testimony, we can accept Socrates' proofs of immortality based on the theory of Forms as historically true without causing thereby any detriment to Plato's originality as far as the conception of the theory itself is concerned. But in the Phaedo much else is said about Socrates, and although Ross is right when he says that Aristotle's testimony 'is compatible with accepting Socrates’ account in the Phaedo (96a-100a) of his mental history as substantially true', it is equally true that we can find nothing in Aristotle that corroborates its veracity, and if we are left with Plato alone concerning this point, there appears to be a seemingly insurmountable discrepancy between the Apology and the Phaedo. For in the Apology Socrates says that for many years he has been misrepresented as a wise man speculating about the things above the earth and under the earth, of which he understands nothing (19c4-5), and flatly denies ever discussing matters pertaining to the philosophy of nature (19c8; 19d8). But in the Phaedo Socrates says that in his youth he had a tremendous desire to learn that wisdom which is called philosophy of nature. He wanted to know the reasons for each thing, why each thing comes to be, why it perishes, and why it exists (96a9-10). He racked his brains over the diverse explanations offered by others: do living creatures develop whenever heat and cold give rise to putrefaction? Do we think with blood, air, or fire? Or is it the brain that provides the perceptions of hearing and seeing and smelling? Is it from sensory perceptions that memory and opinion arise, and is it from memory and opinion when they acquire stability that knowledge comes to be? (96b). He was an enquirer, but in the end he states that he found himself without any talent for this kind of enquiry (teleutôn houtôs emautôi edoxa pros tautên tên skepsin aphuês einai hôs ouden chrêma, 96c1-2).

Plato does not tell us how much insight into natural phenomena underlies Socrates’ criticism of Anaxagoras, but Xenophon provides us with valuable information on this matter. For in the Memorabilia he says that Socrates criticized Anaxagoras’ view that the sun was a stone glowing with fire (lithon diapuron). Socrates did so by pointing out that a stone in fire neither glows nor can withstand fire for long, whereas the sun shines most brightly the whole time (ton panta chronon), that men can look at fire without any difficulty, but cannot gaze steadily at the sun, that human skin gets dark when exposed to the rays of the sun, which is not so in the case of fire, that no vegetation can grow well without sunlight, whereas fire makes it wither (IV. vii. 7). Thus on Xenophon’s account Socrates was a better observer of the sun and other natural phenomena than Anaxagoras ‘who took the greatest pride in his explanation of the divine machinery’ (ho megiston phronêsas epi tôi tas tôn theôn mêchanas exêgeisthai, Mem. IV. vii. 6).

So when Socrates begins his Defence by proclaiming that the jury will hear from  him only the truth (pasan tên alêtheian, Ap. 17b8); does this then mean that in his Defence he was lying ‘to save his skin’?(14) Even a cursory glance at the Apology makes it abundantly clear that ‘saving his skin’ was not what concerned Socrates. If he lied, he did so for the sake of his friends and followers, to protect them against a witch hunt that was expected to follow his trial,(15) and both Plato and Xenophon agree that Socrates maintained that only a philosopher who knows the truth can be an accomplished liar.(16) But our conceding that Socrates did lie in his Defence in order to protect his friends would not solve the problem of Socrates' denial that he ever discussed nature with his friends and followers, for Xenophon’s Memorabilia present us with a similar difficulty without allowing us a recourse to the same explanation. As has been seen, according to Xenophon Socrates did discuss Anaxagoras’ views on nature, and yet Xenophon denies that Socrates discussed the nature of the universe (oude gar peri tês tôn pantôn phuseôs ... dielegeto skopôn, I. i. 11). The solution to the problem can be found in the concept of dialegesthai, that is of ‘discussion’, upon which the denial rests both in Plato’s Apology and in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Xenophon speaks specifically of Socrates’ investigative discussions (dielegeto skopôn) from which the questions of the nature of the universe were excluded, not just of any kind of talking, and what these investigative discussions were we can learn best from Socrates’ mouth in Plato’s Phaedo. There Socrates says that after he had given up the study of nature he decided to take refuge in language itself and in it to investigate the truth about things (edoxe dê moi chrênai eis tous logous kataphugonta en ekeinois skopein tôn ontôn tên alêtheian, 99e4-6). When Socrates uses the term dialegesthai he means an investigative search for the truth about things that can be done by the reflective use of language, without recourse to the senses (65c-66a), that is by reflection on being (to on, 65c9) that could be thought but could not be derived from the senses (74a-75c). Admittedly, Socrates’ use of the term ‘discuss’ is very idiosyncratic, but Socrates did prepare the jurors for it, for he asked them not to be surprised if in defending himself he used the same kind of language (dia tôn autôn logôn, 17c7) that he used in his philosophic discussions (di' hônper eiôtha legein, 17c8); he asked them to view him as a stranger and excuse him for talking in the language which he had been used to (17d4-18a1). When he then makes his appeal to all those who have ever listened to his discussions (hosoi emou pôpote akêkoate dialegomenou, 19d2-3) exhorting them to testify against him if any one of them ever heard him discussing matters concerned with the philosophy of nature, be it in a few words or at length (ei pôpote ê mikron ê mega êkouse tis humôn emou peri tôn toioutôn dialegomenou, 19d4-5), he appeals both to his followers who knew what he was talking about and to his enemies not well acquainted with his use of language, who might be tempted to challenge the veracity of his claim, having heard him talking on Anaxagoras and other philosophers who speculated about the nature of the universe. He does so in the hope that his words would be challenged, and that thus the trial could be transformed into a profound philosophic discussion on this matter. But his enemies disappointed him, for they apparently knew him too well to dare challenging his words on any matter related to philosophy.