The inadequacy of Socrates’ initial proofs of immortality comes to light when Simmias grants Socrates that in contrast to the body, the soul is invisible, incorporeal, very beautiful and divine, but that all these attributes do not guarantee its immortality, and Cebes grants him that the soul existed prior to its embodiment, and may have undergone numerous reincarnations, and yet insists that all this does not prove that one day the soul may not recover from its death, especially since it suffers toil (ponei, 88a8) in each of its incarnations (85b10-88b8). Phaedo says that these objections of Simmias and Cebes disturbed the assembled friends of Socrates very deeply, for they made them ‘doubtful not only about the arguments already put forward but also about points yet to be raised, for fear that we were incompetent judges of anything, or even that these things might be inherently doubtful’ (88c4-7). Of this state Phaedo speaks as their illness, and he says that Socrates acutely sensed it and then healed them well (eu hêmas iasato, 89a5). In the course of this treatment Socrates admitted that he himself had not been fully cured of the illness: ‘let’s not admit into our soul the thought that there’s probably nothing sound in arguments (hôs tôn logôn kinduneuei ouden hugies einai); but let’s far rather admit that we’re not yet sound ourselves’ (hoti hêmeis oupô hugiôs echomen, 90e1-2).(22) That Socrates considers himself not yet sound becomes clear when he adds: ‘but we must strive manfully to become sound (alla andristeon kai prothumêteon hugiôs echein) - you and the others for the sake of your whole future life, but I because of death itself’ (90e3-91a1).(23)
Socrates’ being ‘not yet sound himself’ is underlined by the fact that his initial attempt at proving the immortality of the soul is implicitly negated by his final proof. For the first proof was based on the principle that whatever has an opposite comes to be only from its opposite, and back again, in perpetual reciprocity, revolving as if in a circle. Being dead is opposite to being alive; that which is dead comes to be from that which is living and that which is living from that which is dead. When Socrates makes the argument he avoids saying that ‘living souls come into being from dead souls’ (70c-72d), but when he recapitulates it at 77c9-d4 he says ‘if the soul does have previous existence, and if when it enters upon living and being born, it must come from no other source than death and being dead, surely it must also exist after it has died, given that it has to be born again’ (tr. Gallop). But in Socrates’ final argument it is maintained that the soul is inseparable from the Form of Life (105d3-4) and can therefore never suffer death (Oukoun psuchê ou dechetai thanaton, 105e4).(24)
Cebes was convinced by the necessary connection between the soul and the Form of Life, which Socrates established in his last argument (107a2-3), but Simmias confessed that although he too had no ground for doubt concerning the soundness of Socrates’ final argument (oud' autos echô eti hopêi apistô ek ge tôn legomenôn, 107a8-9), he still was not free of all doubt, for which he blamed human weakness (tên anthrôpinên astheneian, 107b1). But Socrates assured Simmias and all his friends that the initial, fundamental hypotheses (tas ge hupotheseis tas prôtas, 107b5), from which the proof of immortality followed were trustworthy (pistai), and that if they thoroughly analysed them (ean autas hikanôs dielête, 107b7) and followed the argument (akolouthêsete tôi logôi, 107b7) as far as is humanly possible, they would seek no further (ouden zêtêsete peraiterô, 107b9). Then he pointed out what difference the proof made concerning their care for their souls: ‘if the soul is indeed immortal (eiper hê psuchê athanatos, 107c2), then it needs care not only for the sake of this time that encompasses what we call “to live”, but for the sake of all time; and now the danger would surely seem awful, if anyone is going to neglect it. For if death were a separation from everything, it would be a great gain for the wicked, when they died, to be separated at once from the body and from their own wickedness along with the soul; but since it is evidently immortal (epeidê athanatos phainetai ousa, 107c8), there can be no other escape from evil or salvation for it, except to become as good and as wise as possible (plên tou hôs beltistên te kai phronimôtatên genesthai, 107d1-2).’ And so the final instruction with which Socrates addressed his friends was that they should take care for themselves, which meant that they should live in accordance with their present and previous discussions, as if following in footsteps (hôsper kat' ichnê, 115b9) marked by them. Having finally attained the state of certainty that distinguishes knowledge from mere opinion, Socrates' discourses with his friends and followers offered a proper guidance for every true philosopher and retrospectively fully justified the exhortation that Socrates had addressed to Evenus at the beginning of his discourse on the immortality of the soul. Socrates’ trust in the power of logos, that is of questions and answers, of discourse and of arguments was vindicated at least in his own eyes. He believed that he delivered himself and his friends from ignorance concerning matters of the greatest importance for every human being; he and his friends were cured, they owed a cock to Asclepius.
Plato’s two early dialogues, the Charmides and the Hippias Minor, testify to it that the historical Socrates saw ignorance as the illness of the soul from which he endeavoured to be cured with the help of philosophy. In the Charmides Socrates tells a story about a Thracian physician whom he met when serving with the army. The physician insisted that one ought not to attempt to cure the body without curing (iasthai, 156e1) the soul first, for all good and evil in the body originates in the soul; the cure of the soul is effected by discourse that engenders healthy mind (sôphrosunên) in the soul (156d4-157b1). In the course of the dialogue ‘healthy mind’ is identified with self-knowledge (165b4), with knowledge of all knowledge (166e5-6), and thus with knowledge that would be our unerring guide in life, if we possessed it (171d). It is against this ideal of knowledge that Socrates finds himself ignorant. In the Hippias Minor Socrates speaks of his changing views concerning voluntary wrongdoing (planômai peri tauta, 372d8) as caused by his ignorance (dia to mê eidenai, 372e1). Of this state of his soul he speaks as the illness (katêbolê, 372e1) of which he wants his soul to be cured (iasasthai tên psuchên mou, 372e7). Admitting that he was ignorant (phainomai ouden eidôs, 372b6-7), Socrates said that the only thing that saved him from being utterly contemptible was his not being ashamed to learn (ou gar aischunomai manthanôn, 372c3). If we view the Phaedo against the background of these two dialogues, Socrates stands out as a man who throughout his life tried to reach the certainty of knowledge concerning the soul, good and evil, virtue and vice, until he finally achieved his goal to his own satisfaction on his last day.
Let me add to these testimonies the testimony of Phaedo himself. Emperor Julian says in one of his letters (25) that Phaedo of Elis ‘thought that there is nothing that cannot be cured by philosophy (enomizen ouden aniaton einai têi philosophiai), and that by it all men can be purified from all their modes of life, their habits, desires, and simply from everything of the sort’ (445A). If Julian’s reference were limited to these words, it probably would have been taken by scholars as a reference to Plato’s Phaedo, but even as such it would testify to the fact that the ancients were well aware of the curative aspects of Socrates’ discourse on the immortality of the soul. But Julian continues: ‘If philosophy were of assistance only to those who are of good natural disposition (tois eu pephukosi) and well brought up (kai kalôs tethrammenois) there would be nothing marvellous about her, but if she can lead up to the light (anagei pros to phôs) people who are in such a state (kai tous houtô diakeimenous), she seems to me to be exceptionally wonderful.’ The words ‘people who are in such a state’ clearly refer to the historical Phaedo who as a young man was enslaved and was driven by his master to prostitution.( Julian alludes to this when he introduces his reference to Phaedo: ‘You have heard of the Phaedo of Elis and you know the story concerning him’. According to Diogenes Laertius Phaedo wrote two undoubtedly genuine dialogues, Zopyrus and Simon; of these two dialogues K. v. Fritz attributes to the former Phaedo’s words quoted by Julian.(27)
Fritz does so on the basis of the story about Socrates and Zopyrus, which Cicero preserved as follows: ‘As consistency is the characteristic of knowledge, mental disorder is the characteristic of error. Moreover men who are said to be naturally irascible or pitiful or envious or anything of the kind, have an unhealthy constitution of the soul, yet all the same are curable, as is said to be Socrates’ case. Zopyrus, who claimed to discern every man’s nature from his appearance, accused Socrates in company of a number of vices which he enumerated, and when he was ridiculed by the rest who said they failed to recognize such vices in Socrates, Socrates himself came to his rescue by saying that he was naturally inclined to the vices named, but had cast them out of him by the help of reason.’(28) Although Cicero does not refer to the source from which he derived the story, Wilamowitz is undoubtedly right in ascribing it to the Zopyrus of Phaedo, and Fritz is equally right in linking Julian’s reference to Phaedo’s views to Cicero's story about Socrates and Zopyrus and thus to Phaedo's dialogue. If this is correct, then we begin to understand why Plato chose Phaedo as the narrator in the dialogue depicting Socrates’ last hours. In his last discourse and in his last words Socrates emphasized the healing power of philosophy, and next to Socrates Phaedo became the best living example of its wonderful effects.
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